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"Do not control the people with laws, Nor violence nor espionage, But
conquer them with inaction. ",
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. ,2
I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to California water, a quarter of a century is just a moment in
the life of the law.3 That has been the interlude since the Governor's Commission
to Review California Water Rights Law ("Governor's Commission") attempted
to administer a dose of logic to the accretion of codes, cases, and customs
constituting California water law.4 The subsequent experience of implementing
the recommendations for legal reform has yielded mixed results, as the
commentators in this symposium have chronicled.
The Governor's Commission identified four areas for improvement: certainty
in water rights,5 efficiency in water use,6 protection of instream uses,7 and
effective groundwater management.8 The recommendations to reduce uncertainty
in the quantification of water rights-improving recordation of non-statutory 9
and future rights to water,' defining key operative terms such as "reasonable and
beneficial use,"" and fostering basin-wide adjudication of all rights, including
groundwater and non-permitted rights 2-were not adopted by a legislature that
1. LAO TzE, TAO TE CHING ch. 57, available at http://www.chinapage.com/gnl.html (last visited Feb.
12, 2005) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
3. By comparison, it has been over 125 years since the legislature, in 1872, codified the customs that
more or less defined early California water rights theretofore.
4. See generally GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL
REPORT (1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
5. See id. at 16-49.
6. See id. at 50-98.
7. See id. at 99-134.
8. See id. at 135-254.
9. See id. at 17-18. Non-statutory rights include riparian rights and rights of prescription. Whereas
users who appropriate water must file for relevant permits, thereby establishing a detailed record of
consumption, riparian and prescriptive rights holders are not subject to permitting. Id.
10. See id. at 18-21; Samantha Olson & Erin K.L. Mahaney, Searching for Certainty in a State of Flux:
How Administrative Procedures Help Provide Stability in Water Rights Law, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 73 (2005).
11. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 21. Article X, section 2 of the California Constitution reads:
"The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State is
and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served .. " CAL.
CONST. art. X, § 2. The meanings of "reasonable" and "beneficial" are vague and have been determined largely
through case-by-case adjudications; this creates uncertainties for individual water users who wish to comport
with the statutory requirements. See Olson & Mahaney, supra note 10.
12. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 27-30.
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has long ago concluded it is better to tolerate uncertainty in water rights than in
political futures. The Governor's Commission published twelve water use efficiency
and conservation recommendations that could be accomplished through regulatory,
market-based, or administrative mechanisms. 13 Many of these confirm that initiatives
to conserve water will not impair the underlying water right or entitlement. 14 The
Governor's Commission's recommendations on integrating instream flows into the
water rights administration have been largely superceded by regulatory interventions,
such as the completion of flow standards to protect the aquatic ecosystems of the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta (reviewed below),15 by ambitious ecosystem restoration
initiatives promised (although not delivered) by the CalFed Bay-Delta Program, by the
Environmental Water Account 16 (also chronicled below),17 and by the instream water
transfer mechanism provided by section 1707 of the Water Code. 18 Finally, the
Governor's Commission's recommendations on groundwater management have been
13. See id. at 71-72; see also Andrew H. Sawyer, Improving Efficiency Incrementally: The Governor's
Commission Attacks Waste and Unreasonable Use, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 209 (2005); Caitlin Dyckman, A
Dynastic Disruption: The Use Efficiency and Conservation Legacy of the Governor's Commission to Review
California Water Rights Law Recommendations, 36 McGEORGE L. REV. 175 (2005).
14. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1011, 1241 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005); see id. §§ 1210-1212, 1244;
Dyckman, supra note 13.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See Cal. Bay-Delta Authority, Environmental Water Account, at http://calwater.ca.gov/Programs/
EnvironmentalWaterAccount/EnvironmentalWaterAccount.shtml. (last visited Dec. 20, 2004) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). The Water Transfer Workgroup describes the Environmental Water Account
("EWA") in the following terms:
The EWA is a program that allows state and federal fishery agencies to call for reductions in
exports at key times, generally during the winter and spring, to reduce the entrainment of fish
at the state and federal pumping plants in the southern Delta. The resulting reductions in water
supply from these actions are repaid to the state and federal water projects later in the year at
no increased cost to the water projects. Public funds are used to finance the program. Water
transfers are a key component of the EWA. During its first year of operation (water year 2001),
the EWA obtained 264,000 acre-feet of water from transfers. An additional 72,000 acre-feet
held in San Luis Reservoir from water transfers the previous year were also provided to the
EWA by USBR. About 40 percent was obtained upstream of the Delta and about 60 percent
was obtained in the export areas south of the Delta, making the EWA a major factor in the
water market during 2001. In addition, both DWR and USBR instituted dry-year programs and
a program to obtain water supplies for wildlife refuges. These three programs obtained water
transfers of 363,000 acre-feet in 2001. The water for these transfers was obtained mostly
upstream of the Delta for use in areas south of the Delta. Only one relatively small water
transfer (10,000 acre-feet) across the Delta, unrelated to the actions by the state or federal
agencies, was approved last year. In water year 2001 over 630,000 acre-feet were transferred.
The vast majority was transferred either under the guidance of, or funded by, a state or federal
program. The complexity of cross-Delta water transfers and the flexibility derived by using the
water rights of the DWR and USBR to facilitate these transfers makes the active involvement
of these agencies in water transfers a critical factor.
WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, WATER TRANSFER ISSUES IN CALIFORNIA: FINAL REPORT TO THE
CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD 4-5 (June 2002), available at http://calwater.ca.gov/
Programs/WaterTransfers/adobe-pdf/FinalReport%20_WaterTransferGroup.pdf (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). The concept was first tabled by the Natural Heritage Institute in the water policy
dialogue known as the Three-Way Process, in many respects the predecessor to the CalFed Bay Delta Program.
17. See infra Part H.A.
18. See infra Part II.B.3.
2005 / The Future of Water Law Reform in California
largely ignored,' 9 because if there is anything that is scarier to a California legislator
than allocating a public resource such as surface water, it is allocating an incident of
private property such as groundwater. This default has left California--the state that
pumps more groundwater than any other-standing alone with Texas as the only
western states to have failed to enact a statutory groundwater management regime.
In a nutshell, the Legislature has taken steps to secure rights to save water
against the old "use it or lose it" adage and has created a mechanism for
dedicating existing rights to instream flows. But the Legislature has also declined
to adopt recommendations that would have removed uncertainties in water rights
associated with unquantified rights and the vagaries of the reasonable and
beneficial use doctrine. It also declined to enlarge the regulatory reach of the
State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") to prescribe instream flow
standards or to exert jurisdiction over groundwater, leaving both of these areas to
local initiative. If a new water law reform effort were to take up today where the
1978 Governor's Commission left off, would its neglected recommendations still
constitute the most pressing agenda, or has the water world moved on?
Two conclusions regarding the pathways of reform for water management
can be distilled from the record. First, reforming rights and regulations alone will
not solve the next generation of water conflicts in California. The existing water
rights system, and the skein of state and federal regulations in which it is
suspended, are just the beginning point for a consideration of market-based
transfers. Such transfers are essential, during times when all needs cannot be
met-inevitable in a desert climate where interannual variation in runoff can
exceed an order of magnitude-to allocate the available water to the uses of
greatest economic and social value. The regulatory apparatus can always be
improved, yet the SWRCB already possesses more regulatory authority than it is
willing to exercise, often preferring to hold up the specter of mandated solutions
to induce "voluntary" ones.20 Notably, the 1995 Water Quality Control Plan for
the Bay-Delta water system2' is being implemented primarily through agreements
among the water rights beneficiaries in the San Joaquin basin (the Vernalis
Adaptive Management Program), 2 which was then adopted by the SWRCB,23
and the Sacramento Valley Water Management Agreement.24 Both settlements
19. See Kevin M. O'Brien, The Governor's Commissions Recommendations on Groundwater: Treading Water
Until the Next Drought, 36 McGEORGE L REv. 435 (2005).
20. See e.g., Brian E. Gray, The Modem Era in California Water Law, 45 HASTiNGs LJ. 249,277-83 (1994).
21. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO
BAY/SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA ESTUARY (May 1995), available at httpJ/www.waterights.ca.gov/bay
delta/1995WQCPB.pdf [hereinafter BAY-DELTA PLAN] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
22. SAN JOAQUIN RIVER GROUP AuTH., THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER AGREEMENT (March 1999), available at
httpJ/www.sjrg.org/agreement.htm [hereinafter SAN JOAQUIN RIVER AGREEMENT] (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
23. S.W.R.C.B., Revised Water Right Decision 1641, at2 (Mar. 15,2000) [hereinafter Decision 1641].
24. N. CAL. WATER ASS'N, THE SACRAMENTO VALLEY WATER MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT 11 (Sept.
2001), available at http://www.norcalwater.org/pdf/sac%20valley%20water%20mgmt%20agrmt.pdf [hereinafter
SACRAMENTO VALLEY WATER MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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are premised on "physical solutions" in the form of water supply enhancement
strategies-particularly conjunctive water management and water conservation
projects-that will enable the water users to meet their share of the delta inflow
requirements without sacrificing irrigation water.25
Another prime consideration bearing upon the direction of future reforms is that
California's water supply system is so federalized that the state, acting alone, cannot
hope to accomplish all of its needed reforms. The federal Central Valley Project
("CVP") is the largest water supply system in the state (indeed, in the United States),
encompassing some twenty storage dams and reservoirs, eleven power plants, five-
hundred miles of major canals, and over 250 contracting water districts. It manages
some nine million acre-feet of water per year for agricultural, urban and wildlife
uses. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal regulatory
programs drive water allocation and management throughout the Central Valley far
more than do state laws. For example, Federal Clean Water Act26 mandates drove the
development of the state's water quality control plan for the Bay-Delta system.27 The
plan's constraining features are the restrictions on delta pumping that the SWRCB
incorporated-as it was required to do-from biological opinions issued by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS") to protect fish species listed and protected under the Federal Endangered
Species Act ("ESA").28 Operations of the state dam at Oroville and of the non-
project hydropower dams2 9 in the Central Valley are dictated by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Flood control operations for all eleven terminal
reservoirs in the Central Valley system are controlled by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. Water diversion infrastructure in navigable waterways, including all
developed rivers in the Central Valley and its delta, are subject to dredge and fill
permits issued by that same federal agency. To be sure, federal reclamation facilities
are subject to state water rights administration under section 8 of the Federal
Reclamation Act,30 and the Bureau of Reclamation ("USBR") stores and delivers
water subject to water rights permits issued by the SWRCB. But it is fanciful to
imagine that California can reform water use and development practices in the state
simply by tuning up its own water codes.
25. See SAN JOAQUIN RIVER AGREEMENT, supra note 22, at § 6.1; SACRAMENTO VALLEY WATER
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 24, at 12.
26. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2001).
27. It was the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's declaration of the inadequacy of state water
quality standards under the Federal Clean Water Act-and Governor Wilson's fear of losing state prerogatives
to the Federal Endangered Species Act-that drove the SWRCB to reinitiate efforts to promulgate substitute
standards for the Bay-Delta estuary, which culminated in the 1995 Water Quality Control Plan.
28. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 2001).
29. E.g., New Bullards Bar operated by the Yuba County Water Agency, New Exchequer dam operated
by the Merced Irrigation District, and New Don Pedro dam operated by the Modesto and Turlock Irrigation
Districts.
30. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 675 (1978) (upholding the state's authority to impose
"conditions on the permits granted to the United States which are not inconsistent with congressional provisions
authorizing the project in question").
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In sum, the future of water law reform in California will necessarily transcend
the narrow focus of the Governor's Commission on state water rights and regulatory
programs. The reform agenda will be driven by the need to foster, facilitate, and
accommodate water management strategies that reduce conflicts among water users,
including the environment, and these will surely increase as a growing population
places ever greater strains on a fixed and variable supply. These strategies are known
in the law as "physical solutions," which are simply practical alternatives that the
courts or the SWRCB3 1 can either impose or approve to provide water rights holders
the benefits secured by their rights in lieu of their literal exercise. Physical solutions
reduce conflicts among water users and "achieve better overall utilization of the
resource." 32 This accommodative device is a judicial and regulatory response to the
1928 Amendment to the California Constitution, Article X, Section 2, which enjoins
the administrators of water rights in California to derive the maximum public benefit
from a scarce and vital resource.3 3 The physical solution doctrine has been used to
curtail wasteful practices, 34 "compel a senior right holder to accept a substitute
source of water or modification of its means of diversion, distribution, or use of water
at a junior right holder's expense, ' 35 allow appropriators to satisfy riparian rights by
substitute supplies, 36 and address unsustainable demands on a groundwater basin.
37
31. The courts, using their equitable powers, and the SWRCB, through section 275 of the Water Code,
have the authority to fashion and enforce physical solutions to ensure more efficient use of water, provided that
the legal rights of the parties are protected and senior rights holders are not required to incur any material
expense. See generally City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Dist., 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000); City of Lodi v. E. Bay
Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 450 (Cal. 1936) (stating "it is not only within the power but it is also the duty of
the trial court to admit evidence relating to possible physical solutions, and if none is satisfactory to it to suggest
on its own motion such physical solution"). For examples of SWRCB enforcement of physical solutions, see
S.W.R.C.B., Decision 1631 (Sept. 28, 1994); S.W.R.C.B., Order No. WR 98-05 (Sept. 2, 1998); S.W.R.C.B.,
Decision 1600 (June 21, 1984); S.W.R.C.B., Order No. WR 88-20 (Sept. 7, 1988); S.W.R.C.B., Order No. WR
2000-13 (Oct. 19, 2000); S.W.R.C.B., Order WR 96-02 (Feb. 27, 1996); S.W.R.C.B., Order No. WR 94-02
(Feb. 2, 1994); S.W.R.C.B., Order No. WR 93-08 (Nov. 18, 1993); S.W.R.C.B., Order No. WR 90-16 (Nov. 7,
1990).
32. Harrison C. Dunning, The "Physical Solution" in Western Water Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 445, 448
(1986).
33. In the main, the physical solution doctrine is most appropriately viewed as a part of the common law
of water in California. Specific reference is made to the "physical solution" doctrine in four sections of the
Water Code, but each reference is applicable to the protection of the quality of groundwater only. Remarkably,
the Water Code does not mention physical solutions in conjunction with surface water. See CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 2100, 2101 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005); id. §§ 78648, 79149 (West 2004).
34. See, e.g., City of Lodi, 60 P.2d at 450 (where the court struggled to determine how best to distribute
appropriative water rights along California's Mokelumne River in order to avoid waste). In State Water
Resources Control Board v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 853, 858 (Ct. App. 1976), the SWRCB initiated an
action to compel Napa Valley winemakers to implement a physical solution to avoid drawing water directly
from the Napa River during frost season on the grounds that the wine makers could instead implement a water
storage alternative. Id. at 853. The Court of Appeal ruled that the SWRCB's decision was a legitimate exercise
of the police power to enforce the reasonable use requirement of the California Constitution. Id. at 858; see also
Jeffrey A. Wilcox, Note, Taking Cover: Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence as a Tool for Resolving Water
Disputes in the American West, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 502-503 (2003).
35. Dunning, supra note 32, at 448.
36. See Clifford W. Schultz & Gregory S. Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Towards California
Water Resources: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC. L. J. 1031, 1061-86 (1988); A. Dan
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As this article will argue, physical solutions are the pathway to the future in
California. 38 From that vantage point, the improvements in regulatory programs and
in the administration of water rights that are needed to facilitate physical solutions
will constitute the legal reform agenda for the future.
To elaborate on that thesis, this article will describe the types of physical
solutions that appear most promising to improve water resource management in the
near-term in California. 39 The article will then illustrate the types of facilitative legal
reforms that may be warranted by focusing a more detailed analysis on the legal
uncertainties that are today impeding groundwater banking, one of the most
promising techniques for expanding water storage in the Central Valley.40 First, it
will be useful to make reference to two transformational developments in water
management in California that have materially changed some of the realities that
preoccupied the Governor's Commission, particularly with regard to the challenge of
accommodating instream flow demands within the California water rights structure.4 1
I. FROM THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO THE PRESENT:
TWO TRANSFORMATIONAL EVENTS
In the twenty-five years that have elapsed since the Governor's Commission
rendered its recommendations for water law reform, two milestones in California
water management-one in the regulatory realm and one in the planning realm-
have erected a pathway on which future innovations will move forward. The first is
the culmination of a seventeen year-long process to establish water quality standards
that require the exercise of water rights to conform to the ecological requirements of
the Sacramento-San Joaquin delta, the hub of the California water system. 42 The
second is the multi-agency, system-wide planning process, originally known as the
CalFed Bay-Delta Program, and now codified as the CalFed Bay-Delta Authority.43
Tarlock, The Creation of New Risk-Sharing Water Entitlement Regimes: The Case of the Truckee-Carson
Settlement, 25 EcOLOGY L.Q. 674, 704 n.34 (1999).
37. Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533, 561 (Cal. 1938) (stating that "[w]ith a relatively small
quantity of water available, far insufficient to meet all the needs therefore, the court should not grant an
injunction until every reasonable physical solution, and every reasonable source of supply, has been thoroughly
investigated").
38. See infra Part IV.
39. See id.
40. See infra Part V.
41. See infra Part H.
42. See BAY-DELTA PLAN, supra note 21.
43. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 79400-79476 (West 2004).
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A. The 1995 Water Quality Control Plan
The saga leading up to the plan and the steps that have been taken to
implement it are succinctly reviewed in Superior Court Judge Roland Candee's
Statement of Decision in Coordinated Special Proceeding,a4 resolving eleven
consolidated challenges to the SWRCB's Decision 1641, which implemented
the plan.46 The story begins in 1927, when the state filed for appropriative water
rights for what eventually became the Federal Central Valley Projecta'-the
largest reclamation project in the country-which would eventually and
fundamentally alter natural flow regimes in the Central Valley river system and
its delta. Forty years thereafter, the state also applied for permits for its own State
Water Project ("SWP"), creating a second massive and disruptive water storage
and delta export project.48
However, the long and torturous regulatory saga really began in 1978, when
the SWRCB first tried to deal with the resulting impacts on fisheries and delta
habitat by promulgating water quality standards in Decision 1485 .49 Those
standards were obsolete almost from their promulgation. The standards were
predicated upon protection of striped bass as surrogate of the delta ecosystem,
50
but, in an anomaly that may seem comical today, it turned out that the striped
bass is a non-native game species that feeds upon native species.51 Even the
striped bass proved to be an unstable regulatory marker, as the index of their
abundance began to plummet. Eventually, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA")-the federal cop on the beat-notified the SWRCB that it
would have to go back to work on a more satisfactory standard. Soon thereafter, a
state appellate court weighed in with a landmark decision, United States v.
SWRCB (often referred to as the "Racanelli Decision"),52 that proclaimed that the
Decision 1485 standards were legally invalid because the SWRCB had calibrated
them to what the State and Federal Water Projects alone could achieve, thereby
relieving other water rights holders in the system from regulatory responsibility
for maintaining adequate fishery flows. 53 The SWRCB's approach was based on
the theory that, because the Water Projects were the junior water right holders in
44. Statement of Decision, Coordinated Special Proceeding, at 21-35 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County,
May 5, 2003, No. JC 4118) [hereinafter Candee Statement of Decision] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
45. Decision 1641, supra note 23.
46. See also David R.E. Aladjem, Innovation within a Regulatory Framework: The Protection of
Instream Beneficial Uses of Water in California, 1978 to 2004, 36 McGEORGE L. REV. 305 (2005).
47. See Candee Statement of Decision, supra note 44, at 21.
48. See id. at 22.
49. See id. at 23-24; S.W.R.C.B., Decision 1485 (Aug. 16, 1978) [hereinafter Decision 1485].
50. See Decision 1485, supra note 49, at 12-13, 40.
51. The precipitous decline of those native species under drought conditions was the main impetus for
replacement standards that were finally adopted in 1995.
52. 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).
53. ld. at 179-81.
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the system (and by far the largest right holders), they should shoulder the
regulatory burden.54
The Racanelli Decision rejected the SWRCB's approach and held that the
responsibility to exercise water rights to maintain fisheries is not limited to junior
appropriators, but falls upon all rights holders together, be they public or private,
state or federal, junior or senior, appropriators or riparians, subject to the
jurisdiction of the SWRCB or exempt from it.55 This result was based on a spate
of legal doctrines that comprise the bedrock of state power to limit and control
water rights to protect the public interest, including the Constitutional doctrine of
reasonable and beneficial use, the public trust doctrine, and the reserved
jurisdiction of the SWRCB to amend permit terms as contemporary conditions
may dictate.56 However, the appellate court did not vacate the standards because
the SWRCB was already committed to their revision, and some standards, even if
legally infirm, were needed to protect the object of the regulations in the
interim.57
The SWRCB commenced evidentiary hearings in 1987 to set replacement
standards, and continued by fits and starts until new standards were promulgated
in 1995.58 The first set of proposed standards was undermined by the legislature,
and the second attempt ground to a halt inconclusively. A third set ("Decision
1630") was withdrawn by Governor Pete Wilson-after EPA informed the state
that it would reject the proposed standards-because he objected to the federal
government pre-empting state discretion through listings of vulnerable fish
species under the ESA.59
Finally, in 1995, the SWRCB adopted the current Water Quality Control Plan
in Decision 1641.60 The Board set salinity standards to protect agricultural uses in
the south delta, where depleted flows in the summer and fall are a problem.
Additionally, the Board regulated chlorine concentrations in delta exports to
municipal water suppliers. For environmental resources, the Board established
volumetric delta inflow requirements and export pumping rates.6' It is these
environmental regulations that are the most constraining for water project
operations and water users. Ironically, these environmental standards are
calibrated to achieve the conditions mandated by the biological opinions issued
by the federal fishery protection agencies under the ESA, further evidence of
both the federalization of water management in California and the decisive role
of the ESA in establishing the "law of the river."
54. Id. at 179-80.
55. Id. at 190 (stating that "requiring equal responsibility for maintaining the water quality standards...
did not infringe upon or otherwise unlawfully impair... 'vested' appropriative rights").
56. Id. at 185-88, 201-02.
57. Id. at 181.
58. See Candee Statement of Decision, supra note 44, at 26-28.
59. See id. at 26-27.
60. Decision 1641, supra note 23.
61. See id. at 87-89.
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These delta inflow standards must be met through reservoir releases and
bypass flows at diversion points upstream of the delta. In this manner, they
address the instream flow challenge that was the focus of one of the four
substantive areas of the Governor's Commission and, together with other
initiatives such as the Environmental Water Account ("EWA") and delta
ecosystem restoration measures that emanated out of the CalFed Bay-Delta
Program, described below, 62 the anadromous fish restoration program of the
FWS, and dedication of CVP water to environmental protection and restoration
under the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, have gone a long way toward
establishing an environmental protection baseline. As this article will argue
below, the challenge for the future is to move beyond these baseline protections
in the direction of restoration of the aquatic ecosystems that have been damaged
by the intensive water development of the past 150 years in California.63
A final salient note of this regulatory process is that the implementation
programs to achieve these water quality standards are products of negotiated
"settlements" of compliance responsibilities among the Federal and State water
projects and their contracting water districts. As previously noted, these
agreements are the San Joaquin River Agreement (for the purpose of conducting
the Vernalis Adaptive Management Program ("VAMP")) 64 and the Sacramento
Basin Water Management Plan. The underlying strategy for both of these
settlements is "physical solutions" designed to generate the compliance water,
with the USBR acting as the default guarantor of that water.
B. The CalFed Bay-Delta Program
On the heels of the longest drought in recent history, California and the
federal government undertook a five year planning effort to improve the
reliability and quality of water supplies for twenty-two million residential users
and an $18 billion per year irrigated agriculture industry throughout the Central
Valley and Bay-Delta region, while creating the most ambitious program ever to
restore fisheries and aquatic ecosystems. Never before have all eighteen agencies
of the state and federal government with responsibilities for water management
and water-dependent environmental regulation engaged in a consensual planning
process with water stakeholders to forge a mutually acceptable future for the
62. See infra Part I.B.
63. See infra Part I.A.
64. Notably, this compliance agreement has been returned to the SWRCB for further proceedings by a
Superior Court judge hearing consolidated appeals of Decision 1641 on the grounds that the Agreement does
not always assure that the delta inflow requirements measured at Vernalis will be met. The court intimated that
the VAMP experiment would satisfy the Water Quality Control Plan if the SWRCB were to require that the
Bureau of Reclamation (or some other entity) guarantee the additional compliance flows. See Candee Statement
of Decision, supra note 44, at 90. This element of the Superior Court's decision is on appeal to the California
Court of Appeal for the Third District sub nom Westlands Water District v. Anderson, No. C044714. No
decision has been rendered as of this writing.
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Central Valley water system-including the export areas south of the Valley. The
shared objectives of this informal planning process, known as the CalFed Bay-
Delta Program, were to improve water supply reliability for all sectors, restore
the Bay-Delta ecosystem, improve drinking water quality, and address risks to
the delta levee system (on which water exports to the Central Valley irrigation
and the Los Angeles basin depend).65
Because of the attempt to bring all parties under the tent, the resulting water
management framework is a broad political compromise to which technical merit
became subservient. This is most evident in the pragmatic decision to jettison
equal consideration of a delta water transfer alternative that would have reduced
conflicts between water conveyance and essential fishery habitat by segregating
the two demands.66 That proposed solution became politically untenable because
of relentless opposition from delta landowners who have traditionally worried
that such a scheme would invite the Department of Water Resources ("DWR")
and the USBR to abandon maintenance of the delta levees system-which
protects private farmland at considerable public expense-because such a system
would no longer be necessary for water export purposes. But this decision
removed much of the water quality and reliability benefits for the beneficiaries of
water exports out of the delta-the irrigation districts on the west side of the San
Joaquin River, and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
("MWD")-and hence their willingness to pay the costs of implementing the
Record of Decision ("ROD"). In effect, the ROD substituted a pledge of public
money for the abandoned structural solution. Consequently, the implementation
of this program has been almost entirely dependent upon funding from the state
and federal governments. But, by making the implementation of this delicately
balanced political deal depend on annual appropriations, the ROD simply
substituted another forum to perpetuate the historic debates over dams versus the
environment. Californians endowed the state government with the means to
provide its share of the funding by passing Proposition 13 in the year 200067 and
Proposition 50 in 2002. In October of 2004, the U.S. Congress enacted the Water
Supply, Reliability, and Environmental Improvement Act,68 authorizing the
federal agency members of the CalFed Bay Delta Authority to undertake
specified actions to implement the ROD, including water storage investigations,
delta levee stabilization and ecosystem restoration actions. However, funding of
65. CAL. WATER CODE § 79400 (West 2004).
66. For an extended analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of an isolated delta conveyance
system, see NATURAL HERITAGE INST., AN ENVIRONMENTALLY OPTIMAL ALTERNATIVE FOR THE BAY-DELTA:
A RESPONSE TO THE CALFED PROGRAM 85-98 (Oct. 1998), available at http://www.n-hi.org/Publications/
Pubs.pdf/EOA98.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
67. See Robert J. Glennon & John E. Thorson, Federal Environmental Restoration Initiatives: An
Analysis of Agency Performance and the Capacity for Change, 42 ARIz. L. REV. 483, 519-20 (2000) (stating
that "Proposition 13, approved by California voters on March 7, 2000, authorized $1.97 billion in bonds for a
multitude of water management activities.").
68. Pub. L. No. 108-361, 118 Stat. 1681 (2004).
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these activities remains subject to annual appropriations with no assurance that
they will be forthcoming. Unless the appropriations are forthcoming,
Californians are likely to get another grand education in management of water
shortfalls by crisis rather than by foresight, and the tuition is likely to be
particularly high for both human and environmental stakeholders.
We can gain further insight into the agenda for future physical solutions and
facilitative water law reforms by looking at what the CalFed program (if
implemented) will accomplish and what it will leave undone. For the
environment, the big potential gain is a commitment (if it can be funded) to
maintain an ambitious ecosystem restoration program, without a reciprocal
commitment to major new storage or conveyance projects-although there is a
commitment to investigate specified storage options. Urban and agricultural
water users were promised large subsidies for water conservation measures.
Indeed, the ROD proposes to invest some $3 billion in water efficiency
improvements over seven years, by far the most expensive single component of
the plan. 6 9 Thus, the potential for physical solutions involving conservation
transfers within and outside of agriculture should be substantially enhanced. For
improved reliability of water supplies, CalFed assigned the largest role to
groundwater storage, calling for 500,000 to one million acre-feet of new supplies.
However, the ROD addresses only groundwater storage capacities. It does not
consider the source of the water that would be banked,7 ° although other research
suggests that actively recharged conjunctive management projects, such as are
described section IV of this article on physical solutions, can provide large new
yield benefits system-wide.71
69. That commitment is twice as large as the funding for ecosystem restoration or water storage, for
instance. Yet, the CalFed RoD is silent as to the destination of the saved water. If the public is to bankroll these
initiatives, at least some of the benefits should accrue to the public under the logic of the "beneficiary pays"
principle, perhaps in the form of water for the Environmental Water Account. There is also the serious question
of whether the desired results could be achieved more surely and more efficiently by simply giving these funds
to the EWA to enable it to purchase the water from the agricultural water districts and thereby create market
incentives for more efficient use. This can be far more effective than spending public funds to bridge the gap
between the level of water conservation investments that are cost-justified from the vantage point of the grower
or district, and the level of investment that is cost-justified from the vantage point of the public at large.
70. There is an implication that the groundwater storage program is contemplated as a passive recharge
program that relies upon exploitation of native groundwater resources with recharge through natural infiltration.
This approach could be problematic. First, passive recharge projects have very limited potential to contribute to
the water supply reliability goals of CalFed if they are operated to provide local benefits only. Indeed, such
groundwater development is already being pursued where feasible. Second, exploiting native groundwater for
export to service areas overlying other basins is very controversial and tends to be resisted by the groundwater
users in the basin of origin.
71. See infra Part IV. The most promising and abundant source of artificial recharge is the terminal
reservoirs of the Central Valley water system, which are owned by USBR, DWR, the Corps of Engineers, and
several non-project agricultural and urban water districts. Research by the Natural Heritage Institute indicates
that up to one million acre-feet of new supply on an annual average could be generated from reoperation of the
eleven terminal reservoirs of the Central Valley in combination with local groundwater banks. NATURAL
HERITAGE INST., FEASIBILITY STUDY OF A MAXIMAL PROGRAM OF GROUNDWATER BANKING 20 (Dec. 1998).
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The greatest substantive deficiencies of the ROD are probably the failure to
provide any significant improvement in raw water quality for the urban water
supply systems that export water out of the delta and CalFed's unwillingness to
take seriously the seismic risk to the delta levee system. 72 The ROD under-
estimates the risk of seismic levee failure to the delta ecosystem and water
supply, 73 and misses the opportunity to reduce this unacceptable risk by
rebuilding key delta islands back to sea level.74 Neither of these are water supply
conflicts amenable to physical solutions as such. But both have large economic
consequences (actual or potential) that will continue to perturb the California
water policy arena in the years ahead.
III. A NEW PARADIGM FOR RECONCILING COMPETING USES
Physical solutions are the devices crafted by the courts in California to
reduce conflicts among competing water users. Classically, these conflicts were
encountered among water rights holders drawing on a common source of supply.
In recent decades, however, these conflicts are increasingly caused by a new
claimant who is, paradoxically, the original "owner" of the water: the natural
aquatic ecosystem. Environmental water demands have the greatest potential to
perturb vested water rights-and thereby engender conflict-because these
demands represent the latest entrant into a water allocation system that
historically favored early "appropriators" over later ones.
72. The ROD incorrectly assumes that the impacts of levee failure will be limited to short-term impacts
on water quality that can be remedied by an emergency response program. A multiple levee breach scenario will
almost certainly overwhelm emergency response capabilities, leading to permanent inundation of western delta
islands and long-term degradation of the delta environment and water supply.
73. A panel of engineers and seismologists convened by CalFed determined that there is a twenty
percent probability of catastrophic levee failure (ten or more simultaneous levee breaches) over the next fifty
years. Such a failure of the levee system would increase salinity levels throughout the Delta, devastating both
the delta ecosystem and water supply system. The same panel of engineers also concluded that CalFed's plan to
upgrade delta levees would not significantly reduce seismic vulnerability. See NATURAL HERITAGE INST., supra
note 66, at 5-7.
74. Natural Heritage Institute believes that a concerted subsidence reversal program to rebuild key
western delta islands to sea level could simultaneously reduce the risk of levee failure significantly and restore
thousands of acres of tidal marsh in the heart of the delta. Rebuilding the entirety of the subsided delta to sea
level would be a daunting and perhaps impossible task, but rebuilding key islands may be an affordable and
effective way to simultaneously reduce seismic risk and restore tidal marsh. For instance, the CalFed seismic
panel attributed over forty percent of the risk of seismic levee failure to Sherman Island, and its failure would
have the largest impact on the delta's water supply and ecosystem. A concerted effort to isolate and rebuild
large peninsulas on Sherman Island with cross levees and fill could reduce the risk of Sherman Island failure by
fifty percent over the next ten years. See NATURAL HERITAGE INST., SUBSIDED ISLAND RESTORATION DESIGN
IN THE SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA: A SOLUTION FOR LEVEE FRAGILITY AND WATER SUPPLY
VULNERABILITY IN THE DELTA 1-2 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.n-h-i.org/WhatsNew/NHI%20subsided
%20island%20report I.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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Reinstating ecologically beneficial flow patterns requires that a certain
volume of water be available at the right time, with the right frequency, and in
the right place to create the desired instream conditions and to re-establish
necessary river-floodplain interactions. In sum, in restoring ecological flows, we
usually need to address both the environmental supply, and the environmental
demand sides of the equation. Sometimes, as in the case of hydroelectric dams
that do not divert water but simply store it for release through turbines, re-
establishing favorable downstream conditions is a matter of changing the storage
and release regime. In these cases, the challenge is not so much "generating"
environmental water, but modifying management of existing supplies for
ecological benefit. In many other cases, however, the challenge is not just one of
rescheduling a given volume of flow, but dedicating additional water to
environmental uses. That can be done by reallocating water that is subject to
existing rights, or by generating new water not otherwise available to the system.
The vehicles for the first avenue are found in the water rights and regulation
toolkit, which represent the historic means for conservation of aquatic resources;
the vehicles for the second avenue are found in the physical solutions toolkit,
which requires a new paradigm that will pose new challenges to the legal system.
If a Governor's Commission to review California water rights were launched
today, these challenges would occupy a central place in the scope of that review.
To define these challenges, we can compare the trends of the past with the
possible trends of the future.
A. From Protection to Restoration
In the face of headlong and relentless development of the state's rivers for
water supply, conservation efforts have been necessarily focused on protecting
the rivers that remain intact and the aquatic species that can be saved from
extinction. Thus, free-flowing rivers have been preserved under the state and
national Wild and Scenic Rivers programs.75 In the final days of the Carter
Administration, anticipating the sea change in federal environmental sensibilities
of President Reagan, six prized rivers in northern California were designated in a
single stroke.76 In addition, the safety net of the California and federal
Endangered Species Acts has been invoked to keep aquatic habitat conditions
75. See generally NAT'L PARK SERV., NATIONAL WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS SYSTEM, at http://www.
nps.gov/rivers/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
76. NAT'L PARK SERV., WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS BY STATE, at http://www.nps.gov/rivers/
wildriverslist.html#ca (last visited Dec. 20, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). For a concise
summary of the political and legal circumstances of these designations, see Lance Bocarsly, Scenic Rivers
Designation Maintained, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 257 (1985). For a more lengthy discussion, see Sally
K. Fairfax et al., Federalism and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 59 WASH. L.
REy. 417 (1984). The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act allows state governments to designate rivers under state law
and then petition the Secretary of the Interior, rather than Congress, for federal designation. Charlton H.
Bonham, The Wild Scenic Rivers Act and the Oregon Trilogy, 21 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 109, 119 (2000).
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from deteriorating further.77 Necessary though these stopgap measures are in the
view of conservationists, they, in effect, freeze the status quo. These devices do
nothing to repair the damage of the past. Yet, a system in a perpetual state of
biological crisis leaves all water users at risk. A healthy and secure water
resource system is one in which the environmental resources have been restored
to the point where conflicts no longer bring crises. Thus, in the future, legal
structures will need to accommodate a shift from protection to restoration.
Restoration of more natural flow patterns in developed rivers is a large step
beyond the concept of minimum stream flows, which has dominated thinking
about fishery protection in the past as exemplified by the hydropower relicensing
process. In both snowmelt-fed and monsoon-fed stream systems, the natural
hydrograph is characterized by seasonal peak and base flows. These are hard to
recreate when the river is used to store and release water through hydropower
turbines on a rhythm that follows electricity demand curves or where the stream
channel is used as a water supply delivery conduit. Restoration to more natural
flow patterns will require reoperation of existing reservoirs, often in combination
with secondary storage facilities such as groundwater banks, and reconnection of
flood plains with the stream channel. Though difficult to accomplish, natural
resource restoration is the wave of the future, and one of the most vibrant new
areas of applied environmental science.
B. Beyond Legal Mechanisms to Reallocate Water to Development Paths that
Incorporate Restoration
In the past, an arsenal of legal devices has been invoked to reallocate
appropriated water to maintain instream values. Some of these devices are
regulatory programs, some are based on property rights, and some involve
market transactions. Each results in the dedication of water that would otherwise
be stored and diverted for irrigation or domestic uses to environmental purposes.
The following are examples:
1. Regulatory Devices
As hydropower licenses are renewed under the Electric Consumers
Protection Act,78 new instream flow releases are routinely imposed by FERC as
conditions of the new licenses. As of this writing, 541 non-federal hydropower
dams have been relicensed since 1986, and 144 more will undergo relicensing
within the next ten years.79
77. See, e.g., United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
(enjoining water district from pumping to protect migratory salmon).
78. 16 U.S.C.A. § 797 (West 2000).
79. NATURAL HERITAGE INST., HYDROPOWER LICENSES DATABASE (2003) (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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Under the Federal and California Endangered Species Acts, water storage
and diversion projects that create adverse conditions may constitute an illegal
"take" of protected species. Where necessary to the survival of such species, the
authorized fishery protection agencies can prescribe limitations on the operations
of such facilities. Since western watercourses in the arid basins are heavily
developed for irrigation and municipal water supply, as well as flood control and
power generation, aquatic species endangerment is frequent, and the ESA
strictures often dictate the "law of the river.,
80
The Federal Clean Water Act and the California Porter-Cologne Water
Quality Control Act regulate the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of
navigable rivers to support designated uses, including maintenance of fish and
wildlife resources. It is now clear in both U.S. Supreme Court decisions81 and
SWRCB practice 82 that the physical integrity of a watercourse includes the
adequacy of instream flows to support the designated use. Thus, the controlling
feature of the Water Quality Control Plan for the Delta water system is the
prescription of delta inflows from the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers.83
2. Limitations on Property Rights in Water
In the arid west, water is as scarce as it is vital. This reality has impelled
California and other western jurisdictions to adopt numerous well-established
common law doctrines and statutory provisions that significantly limit the nature and
extent of property interests in water. State laws establish that water rights are far from
absolute; indeed, as the U.S. Supreme Court once said, "[r]ights, property or
otherwise, which are absolute against all the world are certainly rare, and water rights
are not among them. '84 Thus, California does not recognize private property rights to
appropriate or use water in an unreasonable manner. This principle has been a
foundational doctrine of California water law since as early as 1855 when the
California Supreme Court gave it recognition in the landmark case of Irwin v.
Phillips.85 Thus, appropriative rights holders have been on notice for more than 100
years that they must exercise their water rights in a manner consistent with
contemporary social needs and values, and that their rights are subject to
modification in light of increasing demands on a finite water supply.86 In 1928,
80. See, e.g., Mary C. Wood, Reclaiming the Natural Rivers: The Endangered Species Act as Applied to
Endangered River Ecosystems, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 197 (1998).
81. See, e.g., PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994).
82. See, e.g., United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).
83. See BAY-DELTA PLAN, supra note 42.
84. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945):
85. 5 Cal. 140 (1855). By the end of the last century, the doctrine was well established as a powerful and
explicit limitation on the exercise of appropriative rights. See, e.g., Barrows v. Fox, 32 P. 811, 812 (Cal. 1893);
Natoma Water & Mining Co. v. Hancock, 35 P. 334, 337 (Cal. 1894).
86. Brian Gray, In Search of Bigfoot: The Common Law Origins ofArticle X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 225, 227, 271-72 (1986).
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California enshrined this common law principle in a constitutional amendment that
prohibits the waste of water, and applies a rule of reasonable and beneficial use,
method of use, and method of diversion to all water rights in California.87 Courts
throughout California's history have held that exercise of a water right in a manner
inconsistent with the reasonable use doctrine can confer no title.
88
The public trust doctrine became a creature of California's common law as
early as 1854, and since then, courts have applied it directly to all of the state's
navigable waters.89 By 1879, the public trust doctrine had been enshrined in
California's Constitution. 90 Because the public trust doctrine incorporates public
property interests in water resources, it necessarily limits the nature and extent of
private interests in those resources. 91 Parties "acquiring rights in trust property
generally hold those rights subject to the trust, and can assert no vested right to
use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust," nor can they claim "a vested
right to bar recognition of the trust or state action to carry out its purposes., 92 In
Marks v. Whitney,93 the California Supreme Court held that, in addition to
87. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 171 (Ct.
App. 1986). In analyzing what is a reasonable use, it is important to distinguish between the two facets of the
reasonable use doctrine as articulated in the California Constitution. The amendment states in pertinent part:
"[tihe right to water... does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method
of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water." This text contains two fundamental limitations on water
rights. First, there is no right to waste water-that is, to extract an amount of water in excess of that which can
be beneficially used. Second, there is no right to extract water in a manner or utilizing a method that is harmful
to other beneficial uses, including fish and wildlife resources. The most definitive appellate court case on the
unreasonable method of diversion doctrine is State Water Resources Control Board v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851
(Ct. App. 1976). Similar results have been obtained where the protected interest is a fishery or other instream
beneficial use as opposed to other water uses. In Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility
District, 605 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1980), the California Supreme Court applied the unreasonable method of diversion
doctrine to reinstate a lawsuit contending that a municipal water supply agency could not properly divert water
at a point harmful to the fishery, where a diversion point downstream of that reach was feasible. Id. at 4-5.
88. See, e.g., Joslin v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967).
89. In Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80 (1854), the California Supreme Court declared that the state "holds
complete sovereignty over her navigable bays and rivers, and... her ownership is... attributed to her for the
purpose of preserving the public easement, or right of navigation." Id. at 87. By 1867, the court expanded this
public easement to include the right to fish. Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365, 372 (1867).
90. See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (former art. XV, § 2) (enacted 1879) (right to navigation; prohibiting
obstruction of navigation); see also id. art. I, § 25 (enacted 1910) (public right to fish).
91. Ward, 32 Cal. at 372 (stating "the right of the State is subservient to the public rights of navigation
and fishery"); People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 84 (Cal. 1913). The state's "power to control, regulate and
utilize [its] waters within the terms of the trust is absolute except as limited by the paramount supervisory power
of the federal government over navigable waters." Colberg, Inc. v. State, 432 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 949 (1968); see also Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. at 87-88. The "paramount supervisory power" referred to by
the court is the federal navigational servitude, which, similar to the public trust doctrine, prohibits private
parties or the state from substantially interfering with the navigability of any stream without the United States'
explicit consent. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 709 (1899) (holding that
private parties were prohibited from building a dam on a non-navigable tributary to a navigable waterway,
where such dam was found to interfere with navigation).
92. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 721, 723 (Cal. 1983)
(emphasis added).
93. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
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protecting the public's right of navigation and fishery, the public trust doctrine
protected the public's interest in environmental preservation. 94 The court stated:
[t]here is a growing public recognition that one of the most important
public uses of the tidelands ... is the preservation of those lands in their
natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific
study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and
habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery
and climate of the area.95
Then in 1983, the California Supreme Court decided National Audubon Society
v. Superior Court of Alpine County,9 6 which held that the public trust doctrine
prevents diversions of water from non-navigable tributaries which impair these
contemporary public trust values in a downstream navigable water body.
97
Water right permits are generally expressly conditioned upon the continuing
authority of the SWRCB to alter or amend the permits at any time, whenever
consistent with the public interest or the public trust.98 Water rights are not
actually "vested" by the issuance of a permit. The purpose of a permit is simply
to establish a conditional priority of usage during an interim period of continuing
supervision by the SWRCB to assure that the water is put to reasonable and
beneficial use.
99
3. Market Transactions
California has a unique, but underutilized, legal framework for transferring
water from consumptive to instream uses. Under section 1707 of the Water Code,
an existing rights holder can petition the SWRCB to amend its permit to
authorize a change in the purpose of use to an instream use. 1°° The petition will
94. Id. at 380.
95. Id.
96. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
97. Id. at 721.
98. The SWRCB may include in a permit to appropriate a provision reserving its jurisdiction to "amend,
revise, supplement, or delete" terms and conditions in a permit in order to prevent waste of water or to "best
develop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water sought to be appropriated." CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1394 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005).
99. A permit ripens into a vested right under a license only after the SWRCB makes certain findings that
the water has been put to reasonable and beneficial use, based on reports that the permittee is required to
submit. Id. § 1600. As explained by the court in United States v. SWRCB:
Once an appropriative water right permit is issued, the permit holder has the right to take and
use the water according to the terms of the permit. Upon compliance with the permit terms, a
license-the final document in the permit process-is issued and the appropriative rights
become confirmed. Until the license is issued, the Board may reserve jurisdiction to amend the
terms of the permit.
United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169 (Ct. App. 1986).
100. CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (West 2004).
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be granted if the SWRCB finds that the change will not adversely affect other
water rights holders or fish and wildlife.' 0 While water rights not subject to
permits-for example, riparian rights and pre-1914 appropriations-are also
nominally authorized to be transferred in this fashion, it is problematic whether a
finding of no harm can be made with respect to such unquantified rights. There
are other critical unresolved issues with section 1707 transfers that might be the
subject of a water rights review process. These issues include the downstream
reach through which a water rights holder can control instream flows (prevent
diversions) under a section 1707 change order, and whether a rights holder can
temporarily dedicate unused water to streamflow under section 1707 to avoid
forfeiture for non-use.
Notably, however, the section 1707 process has rarely been used, just as
other long-term or permanent transfers of water rights are rarely consummated in
California. Instead, the EWA and other buyers tend to look to short-term
transfers (less than one year) of water, rather than water rights under the "spot
market", in order to avoid the need to undergo a water rights proceeding before
the SWRCB and the likely (expensive and time-consuming) reporting and
mitigation requirements under the California Environmental Quality Act
("CEQA"). Whether this state of affairs calls for legal reform or whether the spot
market will remain a satisfactory alternative for the future, remains to be seen.
102
C. Conditioning Water Projects on Environmental Restoration
There is every reason to believe that the aforementioned legal devices will
continue to be used and refined to meet environmental needs as we move into an
era where flow restoration is the prime objective. But these devices also have the
potential to engender conflict over water supply because they satisfy
environmental needs with water that would otherwise flow to irrigation and
municipal uses. They involve a "zero-sum" reallocation. There may be another
pathway that avoids this disadvantage. It involves the potential for advancing
environmental restoration and water supply development compatibly rather than
competitively.
Recent history suggests that California is on the brink of a future in which
major new water development-infrastructure construction or large-scale water
transfers-will not be politically or economically feasible, absent a component
that provides a tangible net environmental restoration benefit. Reciprocally, we
may soon be living in a world in which future increments of ecosystem
restoration will be possible only as a component of a broader water supply
augmentation strategy. Projects that require public funding to be financially
viable will necessarily need to satisfy a public benefit test in the political arena.
101. Id. § 1707(b)-(c).
102. See Ellen Hanak & Caitlin Dyckman, Counties Wresting Control: Local Responses to California's
Statewide Water Market, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 490 (2003).
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Projects with strong environmental restoration features are far more likely to
survive and projects that yield a net environmental improvement will find a
relatively easy path through the permitting and environmental assessment
minefield. For instance, it should be relatively easy to satisfy the mitigation
standard expressed in regulations implementing section 404 of the Clean Water
Act, 0 3 which prohibits discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters
"if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have
less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem. . . .'"04 In California, any project
that is implemented or approved by state agencies, and has a significant effect on
the environment, is subject to the requirements of CEQA.' °5 CEQA, much like its
federal counterpart, the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 106
requires an analysis of environmental impacts projected to result from proposed
projects. 7 However, while the federal courts have consistently limited NEPA to
procedural mandates, CEQA includes a substantive proscription that a state
agency may not approve a project where feasible alternatives or mitigation
measures are available that would "avoid or substantially lessen" significant
environmental effects.10 8 In addition, California agencies are authorized to
undertake mitigation measures to the full extent of their legal powers,1°9 and
public authorities must provide for the enforceability of mitigation requirements
through permit conditions, agreements, or other measures. 10 When preparing a
draft environmental impact report, including discussion of mitigation measures,
agencies must consult with other interested agencies l" and allow public
opportunities for notice and comment.1 2 Water development or transfers that
incorporate a "net environmental restoration benefit," go a long way beyond
mere mitigation of adverse environmental impacts.
Indeed, a future in which water supply and environmental restoration will be
pursued reciprocally rather than competitively seems to be here already.
Improving water supply reliability while restoring aquatic ecosystems-"getting
better together"-was a theme underlying the CalFed Bay-Delta process. The
new paradigm is also exemplified by current events, such as the mega water
transfer from the Imperial Irrigation District to the San Diego County Water
103. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a) (West 2000). Section 404(a) authorizes the EPA to prohibit or restrict
permits issued by the Corps of Engineers for impacts to navigable waters which EPA determines will have an
"unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning
and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas." Thus according to its plain text, section 404 extends beyond
traditional notions of water quality to wildlife and recreation concerns.
104. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2004).
105. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1996).
106. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4347 (West 2003).
107. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100.
108. Id. §§ 21002, 21081.
109. Id. § 21004.
110. Id. § 21086.6(b).
111. Id. §§ 21003.1, 21086.6(c), 21104.
112. id. §§ 21003.1, 21091,21092.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 36
Authority, to implement the Quantification Settlement Agreement ("QSA") on
the Colorado River. This deal would not have been possible without the state
commitment to restore the Salton Sea.1 3 In a similar vein, it seems unlikely that
new surface storage projects such as Sites Reservoir will be politically viable
unless some fraction of the storage is dedicated to environmental purposes.1
1 4
Likewise, the expansion of pumping capacity in the south delta under the "Napa
Agreement'' 1 5 will probably not prove viable unless it results in net benefits for
the EWA. New water development projects are often dependent upon public
financing, which is increasingly difficult to obtain absent a public benefit such as
environmental restoration through CEQA mitigation requirements. It is unlikely,
for instance, that the storage enhancements that the CalFed ROD targets for
investigation will be economically viable unless they dedicate a fraction of their
water storage to environmental restoration. Environmental benefit has become an
explicit weighting factor in awarding bond funds to groundwater storage projects
under Proposition 13.116
113. The QSA, signed into effect in October 2003, was the culmination of seven years of intensive
negotiations between federal and state government officials and the San Diego, Coachella, Imperial, and
Metropolitan Water Districts of Southern California. It resolved a seventy-year water war centered on
California's recurrent overdraft of almost one million acre-feet per year of Colorado River water, and at the
same time promised long-term environmental benefits through water conservation, efficiency programs, and
wetlands restoration. Under the terms of the Agreement, California will have fourteen years to reduce its
overdependence on Colorado River water, a feat it will accomplish largely by transferring water from
agricultural use in the Imperial Valley to municipal use in San Diego County. The San Diego district will pay
market prices for the water, or about $258 per acre-foot, compared to the $15 or $20 per acre-foot paid by
Imperial Valley farmers. Farmers will be compensated for their water loss and will be encouraged through
financial incentives to conserve water and participate in a temporary fallowing program to reduce water use.
One of the key inducements in the negotiations was a commitment by the State of California to finance
restoration efforts in the Salton Sea, a vast inland lake that depends on inflows from the irrigation tailwater
produced from Imperial Valley farms, to offset the reduction in those inflows that would result from the deal.
DEP'T OF WATER RES., COLORADO RIVER QUANTIFICATION SETrLEMENT AGREEMENT, at http://www.salton
sea.water.ca.gov/crqsa/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
114. The Sites off-stream storage project is considered by DWR and CalFed to be one of the most cost-
effective and environmentally beneficial new facilities proposed for construction in California. A joint planning
effort is currently underway for the 1.9 million acre-feet reservoir, which would enhance water management
flexibility and water supply reliability for environmental, urban, and agricultural uses throughout the state. Sites
Reservoir would be a critical component of an integrated water management program for the Sacramento
Valley, providing additional storage capacity for water diverted from the Sacramento River during peak flow
periods in winter months. The stored water would then be released in average and dry years to enhance Delta
outflows, recharge critical groundwater supplies, contribute to the EWA, and meet or supplant other urban,
agricultural, and environmental water needs, including in-stream flows for fish migrations.
115. Revealed in August 2003, the Napa Proposition is a proposal by state and federal water agencies
and California's biggest water contractors for increasing water supplies to the Central Valley and Southern
California, and for sharing water that will become available if the expansion of the capacity of the Delta export
pumps at Tracy is approved. The "proposition" seeks to improve integration and coordination of day-to-day
operations of the State Water Project and the Federal Central Valley Project. State contractors would have
access to federal reservoirs to store their water. In exchange, federal contractors would be allowed to ship water
through state pumps. In addition to improving overall operating efficiency, the plan would increase the water
supply for both projects and reduce water supply uncertainty. However, in the opinion of this author, the
proposition is likely to be viable only if it also provides benefits for the EWA, such as providing permanent
water assets in lieu of spot market purchases dependent upon annual appropriations of funds.
116. CAL. WATER CODE § 79141 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005).
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By contrast, water projects that have failed to include an environmental benefit
have not proven to be politically viable. The failed efforts to appropriate federal
funds for the Auburn Dam on the American River are a recent case in point. In
1965, Congress authorized construction of the dam to protect against floods, store
2.3 million acre-feet of water for cities and farms, provide 300 megawatts of
hydroelectricity, and create new recreational opportunities. But the dam would
have further impaired environmental flows on the river. Construction on the dam
was halted in 1975 after an earthquake in Oroville raised concerns about the safety
of the proposed dam. Since then, the Auburn Dam and related projects have been
considered by Congress in some twenty studies. But intense opposition from
environmentalists, river rafters, and taxpayers to the proposed dam has led to its
repeated rejection by Congress. In an unprecedented move, the USBR is now
completing a plan to flood the abandoned construction zone of the defunct Auburn
dam to open seven miles of river for whitewater rafting by late 2004, restoring
habitat for fish and other species.
Dual purpose water projects-that augment water supply while improving the
environment-will generally entail physical improvements in water storage,
delivery, and use. The large potential for such "physical solutions" to resolve
conflict between environmental restoration goals and water supply development is
a key to a more harmonious California waterscape. Is the current state of water
laws and institutions adequate to foster, facilitate, and accommodate the types of
physical solutions that have the greatest potential? We can discern where future
legal reforms may be warranted by first taking a closer look at such management
strategies. As we shall see, finding physical solutions requires an entirely different
way of thinking about rivers, not as discrete segments under the jurisdiction of
separate regulatory or management entities, but as an integrated physical system
that includes surface and groundwater interactions, and in which changes at any
particular part reverberate downstream-and, through more sophisticated
management arrangement, upstream as well. This new way of viewing river
systems requires not just new analytical tools-"whole basin" hydrologic planning
models-but entirely different planning, management and regulatory institutions,
and the laws to govern them.
IV. THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA WATER LAW REFORM:
"PHYSICAL SOLUTIONS"
Water rights, and other legal devices for managing natural resources in general,
are not ends unto themselves. They are but a set of social conventions that may or
may not be efficacious in achieving certain objectives in the physical world. The
need for reforms should be viewed through the lens of how well these legal tools
serve broader objectives. In the California water arena, the classic challenge is
expanding the economic, social, and environmental benefits that can be derived
from a limited and variable endowment of water-both ground and surface.
Another way to state the relevant reform metric is: how well do current legal tools
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facilitate "physical solutions" to water resource conflicts? That metric, unlike
abstract assumptions about how legal doctrines should work, will tell us a great
deal about what needs to be fixed and how to fix it. "Physical solutions" are
strategies for bringing new water into an over-taxed system and improving the
operational flexibility of water storage and delivery facilities to meet new needs.
Conceptually, the types of techniques that can be utilized fall into just a few
categories. Describing some of these may provide some useful insights into the
sufficiencies or deficiencies in existing legal structures to facilitate the application
of these physical solutions.
A. Reducing Physical Losses of Water
A key strategy for generating water that can be used to reduce conflicts among
water users is to save water that would otherwise be lost to beneficial use. This
gives rise to water that can then be transferred to effect a physical solution. These
arrangements are sometimes called "conservation transfers."
' 17
Because agriculture is by far the single largest consumptive user of water,"18
strategies for reducing physical losses in agriculture will have the greatest payback.
In agriculture, water only goes in four directions, and by tracking its fate we can
understand where losses can be harvested to supplement ecological flow needs.
Irrigation water can go up into the atmosphere where it is lost to evaporation, a
substantial loss on farms in the ard Central Valley where flood irrigation and
inefficient sprinkler applications remain common, even today. Irrigation water may
also go down, where it may replenish groundwater that is being beneficially used,
or it may percolate into saline aquifers and be lost to subsequent reuse; or in, that
is, into the biomass that is the product of agriculture. Finally, irrigation water can
go out, as water flows from agricultural lands back into rivers or streams.
The first three routes-up, down, and in-each present an opportunity for
application of improved technologies and techniques for the reduction of
consumptive use. Evaporation (the upward flow) can be reduced through improved
methods of applying irrigation water. The downward flow can be reduced through
application of proper amounts of water. The inward flow (into biomass) can be
reduced by replacing existing crops with high value, water frugal crop types. Of
course, all of these routes are entailed when agricultural land is fallowed, as in dry
year leasing arrangements. The disadvantage of fallowing is that it can produce
third-party economic impacts on the local agricultural community. These are not,
however, injuries to "legal users of water" within the meaning of the California
Water Code and are not, accordingly, grounds for the SWRCB to disapprove the
conservation transfer."19
117. Ronald A. Kaiser, Texas Water Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal
Analysis, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181, 199 (1996).
118. Gray, supra note 20, at 308.
119. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., A GUIDE TO WATER TRANSFERS, DRAFT 3-7 to 3-9 (July 1999),
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Much recent legislative reform has been directed at fostering such
conservation transfers,1 20 but to limited effect. Experience has shown that the
barriers to efficiency improvements in agriculture have not been primarily legal,
but economic.
Water savings are usually made possible through economic incentives.
Today, California farmers are about as efficient as is economically justified,
given the artificially low prices they pay for water. To improve efficiencies, the
value of irrigation water would have to be increased to make it worthwhile (and
economically rational) for farmers (and their districts) to invest more in
efficiency measures and technologies. In theory, this could be done by raising the
cost of water, but that would not be acceptable to farmers. The alternative is to
raise the value of water in agriculture without raising the cost. That is what water
markets can do. If the market value of water is higher than its irrigation value
(which is the case where water is applied inefficiently or on low-value crops), it
is worthwhile for the farmer (or district) to invest more in water conservation or
crop shifting. This incentive is greatly increased if the conserved water can be
stored for use during years of relative scarcity.
Today, there is not much incentive to make investments that could save water
but that would pay off only over several years, because the market for conserved
water is intermittent. In years when there is a lot of water available, the
incentives to conserve are low because the demand for (and therefore the market
value of) the water is relatively low. Conversely, in dry years, there is not much
potential for saving water for future years because the water is needed for present
consumption.
However, if water districts or government agencies offer to buy back
entitlements from growers during wetter than average years (and thereby bolster
the market prices) for resale during drier years, multi-year investments in water
conservation will become worthwhile and the value of conserved water will be
maximized. The purchased water must be stored, either in groundwater banks or
through arrangements with surface reservoirs. When it is extracted in drier years,
it is resold to the growers as a supplement to surface water deliveries and at
prices that recoup the initial purchase costs plus the storage and administrative
costs. This is a powerful dry year coping strategy for the growers, assuring
improved reliability of supplies for the agricultural district. It is also a powerful
water conservation incentive because it provides market opportunities in wetter
years, when demand and therefore prices are otherwise relatively low, as well as
in drier years, when demand and therefore prices naturally provide strong market
incentives to conserve.
available at http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/watertransferguide.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
120. See, e.g., Sawyer, supra note 13; Dyckman, supra note 13; Ryan S. Bezerra & Yvonne M. West,
Submerged in the Yuba River: The State Water Resources Control Board's Prioritization of the Governor's
Commissions Proposals, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 331 (2005); Aladjern, supra note 46; Gray, supra note 20.
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CalFed acknowledges that "in order to promote water use efficiency
measures in the agricultural sector, end users need to be able to beneficially
participate in an active water transfer market."'' It then "recognizes that one
barrier to an effective water transfer market is the lack of incentive for individual
landowners to utilize available water conservation technologies because any
water savings frequently accrue not to the landowner but to the irrigation district
or water supply agency."'' 22 The problem of conserved water reverting to the
"common pool" is actually easily addressed through the type of district buyback
program described above.
Just what may be necessary by way of legal reforms to foster water district
conservation buy-backs is grist for a future "Governor's Commission." I do not
attempt to supply the answers here, but only to suggest conceptual pathways that
may lead to important reform recommendations.
B. Modifying Existing Water Storage and Delivery Infrastructures
There are bountiful opportunities to convert existing (and future) hydraulic
infrastructure into ecosystem restoration projects. An obvious example is the
removal of now obsolete dams and other barriers to enable fish and other aquatic
life to access upstream and downstream habitats. While valuable and dramatic,
the practical opportunities are limited in number. Fortunately, there are many
other opportunities for converting environmentally damaging water development
into environmentally beneficial projects, particularly through modifying the
operations of existing water facilities. The most obvious examples of re-
operating dams for environmental restoration are found in the relicensing of
hydroelectric dams. But many other opportunities also exist, including re-
operating flood control and irrigation supply dams.
The core idea here is to deliver some fraction of the water in storage after the
irrigation season into groundwater banks, thereby increasing the flood retention
capacity of the reservoir. The flood releases thus captured can then be managed
to restore a semblance of the natural variability in streamflows in a manner that is
calculated to achieve specified ecological restoration objectives in the floodplain.
In effect, the reoperation converts uncontrolled flood events to controlled flood
events that can better achieve these restoration goals. This is the technique that
will make it possible to restore environmental flows to the San Joaquin River in
the Central Valley of California. The technique shows great promise for other
highly engineered water systems as well.
121. CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, CALIFORNIA'S WATER FUTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 27
(June 2000), available at http://calwater.ca.gov/Archives/GeneraArchive/adobe-pdf/new-final-framework.pdf
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). A district-to-district electronic trading system, utilizing that
approach, is actually already operating on the west side of the San Joaquin River, within the San Luis & Delta
Mendota Water Authority ("SL&DMWA"). It is called WaterLink, and it is the creature of a collaboration
between the Natural Heritage Institute, the University of California, USBR, and SL&DMWA.
122. Id.
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Some of the candidates for reoperation would include those where the
following conditions exist:
* Reclamation dams that spill water for flood control on a reasonably
frequent basis, and serve areas where groundwater has been intensively
developed (most irrigation projects fit these criteria), can often be re-
operated to generate source water for actively recharged groundwater
banks;
* Points of diversion of reclamation water can often be relocated
downstream of the existing out-take to allow a longer reach of the
natural channel downstream of the reclamation storage dam. Where
the storage and release regime of the storage dam can also be
modified to re-introduce peak flow events through this same reach,
more natural flow conditions can be reintroduced through a longer
reach of the downstream floodplain;
* Where levees can be set back or removed, storage dams can be re-
operated to reconnect portions of the historic floodplain with the
river channel on a seasonal basis.
* Sediment processes can sometimes be re-establishing in sediment
deprived channels below dams;
* Flood easements can alleviate flow constraints in floodplains that
have been developed under artificial flow regimes below dams; or
* Sequential use arrangements can be set up, where some portion of
the restoration flows are later diverted for groundwater banking
and/or immediate consumptive uses.
C. Augmenting Storage of Flood Flows through Groundwater Banking
California's chronic water problems are due in large part to the difficulty of
storing water to cope with the great variability in runoff among seasons and
years, and doing this without violence to natural riverine functions. The most
promising future method for augmenting storage in this manner will be
integrating the existing reservoir system with potential groundwater banks. Work
by the Natural Heritage Institute demonstrates that large new yield can be
captured with this technique-up to a million acre feet on an annual average-
and that the surplus water can be managed to restore a more natural flow regime
in the floodplains below these storage dams--essentially converting uncontrolled
flood events into controlled flood events-before it is delivered for consumptive
use. 123 The law reform agenda to facilitate this type of physical solution is
123. See generally NATURAL HERITAGE INST., supra note 71.
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described at length below to illustrate the type of detailed analysis that is
warranted for all of the physical solution examples set forth in this Article.
D. Treating Unusable Water Sources
Facilities to desalt ocean water are now emerging as the marginal source of
municipal water supply for the larger coastal water utilities in California. This
"physical solution" truly represents a new, and virtually limitless, source of water
not otherwise available. If near term economics permit its exploitation in
appreciable volumes, it would relieve diversion pressures on elements of the
Central Valley system where ecosystem conflicts tend to be particularly high,
such as the migratory pathway for salmon runs in the Delta, where the largest
water export pumps in the world now operate. Approximately six-million acre-
feet are diverted from the south end of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta each
year. 124 Of this amount, one million acre-feet flow to the MWD, the largest urban
water utility in the nation. An additional 1.7 million acre feet flow to the
Westlands Water District, the largest agricultural water district in the nation, and
to Kern County for irrigation.
Diversions of water from the south delta have had a devastating effect on
salmon migration. Millions of young salmon are diverted from the Sacramento
and San Joaquin River to the pumps, instead of finding their way to the ocean.
Most are eaten by predators, and many of the rest are pumped into the state and
federal aqueducts or killed in the handling process.
125
These water exporters could be "backed out" of the delta to a large extent if
substitute sources of water could be found. Purification of salt water could
provide that option. The price of desalting ocean water is dropping quickly. It is
now competitive with new SWP water supplies.t 26 Using existing coastal power
plants and the Salton Sea, it would be possible to produce a significant supply of
desalted water. This water would meet the future water needs of the MWD, and
also replace their delta supply with desalted water.
Even better, perhaps, would be to desalt the saline aquifers that underlay
Westlands and Kern County agriculture that make farming increasingly difficult.
These aquifers are less salty than seawater and, consequently, are less expensive
124. REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD. CENTRAL VALLEY REGION, DIAZINON AND
CHLORPYRIFOS TARGET ANALYSIS: WORKPLAN PRODUCT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF DIAZINON AND
CHLORPYRIFOS TOTAL MAXIIM DAILY LOADS IN THE LOWER SACRAMENTO RIVER, LOWER FEATHER RIVER,
LOWER SAN JOAQUIN RIVER, AND THE MAIN CHANNELS OF THE SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN RIVER DELTA 4
(June 2001), available at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/centralvalley/programs/tmd sjrp/TargetAnalysis.pdf
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
125. Joshua Harris, Note, A Lasting Proposal for Endangered Bay-Delta Fish Survival: The
Environmental Water Account and the Accumulation of Water Contract Rights in the Central Valley Project
and State Water Project, 26 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L & POL'Y J. 121, 127 (2002).
126. CAL. COASTAL COMM'N, SEAWATER DESALINATION AND THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT 9 (Mar.
2004), at http://www.coastal.ca.gov/energy/14a-3-200 4 -desalination.pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
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to desalt. That provides the interesting option of MWD paying to desalt these
aquifers and using that water in lieu of pumping out of the delta. This would
reduce the pumping impacts in the delta, reduce the cost of treating the poor
quality water from the delta, and improve the farmlands all at once. At least
300,000 acre feet of delta pumping could be eliminated in this way. Utilizing
both of these desalinization options, it might be possible to reduce delta pumping
by as much as twenty percent. Most biologists agree that this could have a
tremendously positive effect on salmon outmigration.
27
E. Water Transfers
New water may be generated using some of the physical solutions described
above, and an essential component of the solution strategy will probably also
entail transferring the new water to new uses or to offset existing uses, be they
consumptive or instream. The legal reforms that have been suggested to facilitate
water transfers largely focus on measures to expedite the approval processes,
avoid redundant approval steps, reduce the paperwork burdens, and create
uniform requirements for the subset of water transfers that are unlikely to cause
untoward consequences. The Water Transfer Workgroup, for instance, has
suggested the following types of transfers should be eligible for streamlined
approvals based on minimal studies and analysis while providing protection for
all legal water users and the environmental resources affected by the water
transfers: 1
28
" Intrabasin transfers not involving conveyance through the delta; 12 9
* Conservation transfers not involving third party impacts;
* Instream flow transfers;
* Transfers within the CVP or SWP export service areas;130
* Transfers that are limited to the amount consumptively used;
" Transfers that do not result in changes to existing land use or alter
existing employment at the source location;
127. See, e.g., Jennie L. Bricker & David E. Filippi, Endangered Species Act Enforcement and Western
Water Law, 30 ENvTL. L. 735, 747-48 (2000).
128. WATER TRANSFER WORKGROUP, supra note 16.
129. For interbasin transfers, accompanied by more complex issues (including the need for use of state
and federal conveyance facilities), it is critical that DWR and USBR take an active role in the approval studies
needed to address these transfers. In particular, these agencies would need to undertake specific analysis of the
cumulative effect that the transfers may have on the operations of their respective conveyance facilities, as well
as other resources over which they have jurisdiction. The involvement of USBR, as a federal agency, would
also require the consultation and coordination of other federal authorities when endangered species issues arise,
including FWS and NMFS.
130. The regulatory process for approval of such transfers is facilitated by consolidating the place of use
of the federal water project permits so that SWRCB change orders are not required.
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* Transfers that do not change existing land use or induce future
growth at the transfer destination.
The Work Group also recommends establishing shared places of use for the
CVP and SWP for transfers that do not entail land use changes in the source area,
induce growth in the receiving area, or adversely affect endangered species or
their habitats. This would facilitate both interbasin and intrabasin transfers by
allowing an overall SWRCB review and approval of the authorized place of use,
thereby reducing the number of steps needed to gain approval of a proposed
transfer. If the transfer also requires the approval of DWR or the USBR, USBR
or DWR should also participate in the SWRCB proceedings and abide by the
SWRCB's findings in order to avoid duplicative analysis by the other agencies
on matters that were considered by the SWRCB.
Considerations of time and space do not permit a thorough review of the
sufficiencies or deficiencies in existing legal structures to facilitate the
application of all of the foregoing categories physical solutions. However, we can
take one of the most promising techniques to illustrate how a contemporary
review of California water law might evaluate the need for reforms to facilitate
these techniques.
V. AN EXAMPLE OF LAW REFORMS NEEDED TO FACILITATE PHYSICAL
SOLUTION OPPORTUNITIES: THE CASE OF GROUNDWATER BANKING 3'
Actively recharged groundwater banking 32 is one of the most promising
physical solutions for the future of water management in California. When
surface water is abundant, it is possible to divert water into underground aquifers
for later withdrawal and use. Groundwater banking differs from other water
transfers by creating a new supply, rather than just reallocating water from other
users. These projects generally involve the importation of foreign surface water
originating from a source not hydrologically connected to the groundwater
131. The material for this part of the article is drawn from section 5 of the Water Transfer Workgroup,
supra note 16, entitled "Transfers of Water Into and Out of Actively Recharged Groundwater Banks," which
was written by this author with the assistance of Peter Kiel, now practicing at the Sacramento firm of Ellison,
Schneider and Harris. The author also wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Andrew Sawyer, Deputy
Chief Counsel of the State Water Resources Control Board who contributed materially to the analysis contained
in the Water Transfer Workgroup Report. While the workgroup members that participated in this analysis
represent a broad range of interests and perspectives within the water community, not all of the opinions or
conclusions are necessarily endorsed by all of the participants.
132. Groundwater banking projects analyzed in this Article involve intentional recharge and recovery.
The recovery of incidental or unintended groundwater recharge, such as occurs through deep percolation of
irrigation water, is a different topic. Note, however, that the term "conjunctive use" is often used
interchangeably with "groundwater banking," and "conjunctive use" encompasses both direct recharge of the
aquifer, by spreading or injection of surface water into the aquifer ("actively recharge groundwater banking"),
and indirect or passive recharge of the aquifer through substitution of surface water in lieu of groundwater
pumping ("in lieu" recharge). See, e.g, CAL. WATER CODE § 79171 (West 2004).
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banking site. 133 The imported water is then injected underground or is applied to
spreading grounds where it percolates into the aquifer. The banked water will
then be pumped and transferred to non-overlying users during dryer years. The
recharge and recovery will be conducted by (or under contract with) an overlying
landowner, water district, or groundwater management authority. The Kern
Water Bank and the Arvin Edison/MWD arrangement are examples of this type
of groundwater banking project. The sequence can also be reversed in the case of
full aquifers, most commonly found in the Sacramento Valley, such that native
groundwater is first extracted and exported to create storage space, and then
subsequently replenished from an imported surface source. To win the support of
local groundwater users, this mode of groundwater banking requires firm
assurances that the artificial recharge will actually occur. One way to do that is to
convey rights to water in reservoir storage before the extraction takes place, so
that the local groundwater managers can control the replenishment themselves.
34
Alternatively, the recharge can be accomplished through the substitution of
surface water supplies for existing groundwater use, and recovery can be
accomplished by reversing this arrangement. From an aquifer mass balance
standpoint, such "in lieu" storage may be similar to active recharge projects. In
effect, groundwater users agree to forebear pumping groundwater during some
periods and instead use surface water which they would not otherwise use, and
the conjunctive use program then utilizes groundwater during drier years, over
and above historical extractions, and exports it or a like amount of surface water
from the basin. This differs from groundwater substitution projects, which do not
involve the export of groundwater and its replenishment through imported
recharge water. In lieu banking may be more appropriate than recharge by
percolation through spreading grounds in areas with low permeability soils, as is
the case in the east side of the Sacramento Valley. The Semitropic Groundwater
Banking Program in the San Joaquin Valley is an example of in lieu recharge.
Active recharge and in lieu groundwater banking must as a practical
necessity be developed with the cooperation and consent of overlying
landowners, groundwater appropriators, water districts, and groundwater
management authorities. Indeed, the recharge and recovery operations will
generally be conducted by such local interests. There is no realistic prospect of
"outside" interests imposing a water bank on reluctant local communities.
Projects will also entail consensual contractual arrangements with a source water
rights holder (in other words, a reservoir operator and/or direct diverters with the
133. For the purposes of this article, "imported water" refers both to "foreign water imported from a
different watershed" or water that comes from an in-basin source that is not hydrologically connected with the
banking site within a relevant period of time (for example, surplus flows of a river). City of Los Angelesv. City
of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1295 n.55 (Cal. 1975). This definition would include water that originates
within the same hydrologic basin as the banking site, provided that it would not be available for extraction at
that site but for the physical act of bringing it to that location as recharge water.
134. Such "front-end" assurances distinguish this approach from transfers of native groundwater with
"back-end" mitigation.
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capacity to utilize groundwater) and one or more end use beneficiaries. Sufficient
financial and/or hydrologic rewards must accrue to each of these parties to induce
all parties to participate in the banking scheme. The need for clear rules to avoid
and arbitrate disputes arises in part because of the very real possibility of
disagreements among the local landowners themselves over whether an aquifer
should be utilized for groundwater banking purposes. Usually, the proponents
propose to bank water for the benefit of end-users outside of the groundwater
basin. That, after all, is the purpose of groundwater banks.
The primary technical issues of groundwater banking projects involve
designing, implementing, and monitoring the recharge and extraction operations
without causing injury to other water users or damaging real or personal
property. 35 The primary legal issues arise in the permitting and environmental
review processes. To the extent the groundwater banking project requires a new
water right or approval to change an existing water right, the California water law
regulations require the project proponent to bear the burden of establishing that
the recharge and withdrawal of water will not adversely affect, or "injure," other
"legal users of water."'' 36 Determining injury in the groundwater banking context
is difficult due to the different standards governing surface water and
groundwater. 137 The banker must also avoid degrading the quality of the in situ
groundwater. 138  At a minimum, the SWRCB can impose conditions on
135. Aquifer geometries are usually rather poorly defined. Subsurface water interacts with surface flows.
Water in aquifers is not static, but is itself in perpetual slow motion along gradients and in response to
differential hydrostatic pressures. Artificial recharge alters the hydrostatic pressures within the groundwater
basin and may cause some of the native groundwater to become unrecoverable to overlying landowners (by
migrating to a salt sink or a surface water body, for example). The potential for injury to other groundwater
users may be mitigated or avoided by adjusting the rates, volumes, and locations of the extraction wells and the
residence time of the banked water. Under the extract and then replenish scenario, care must be taken not to
deplete hydrologically connected streamflows or to lower the groundwater table below the level of existing
wells.
136. CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005).
137. It is important to note a distinction relating to the concept of "injury" that makes the analysis much
more uncertain (and so raises the question of clarification). With regard to groundwater, California law is
relatively clear (given the paucity of cases) that, in order to state a claim for interference with an overlying
right, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's use of its overlying right has not been reasonably based, in all
likelihood, on the impacts to the plaintiff. This standard of reasonableness means that not every extraction of
groundwater that causes a reduction in static water levels rises to the level of an "injury." Nevertheless, at a
minimum, the groundwater banker must avoid raising the groundwater table to a level that invades the root
zones of neighboring crops or neighboring structures, or causes risk of liquefaction. Bankers must avoid
unreasonably lowering the groundwater table below the level that would result in the dewatering of neighboring
wells or increasing the power requirements for pumping, and/or causing subsidence or seawater intrusion. By
contrast, there is less flexibility in the concept of injury in connection with surface water. In that context, a
physical solution can only require a senior water right holder to suffer "de minimis" costs and/or changes in the
availability of water in order to make water available to a junior water right holder.
138. Commingling lower quality recharge water with in situ groundwater may constitute a legally
cognizable injury to other groundwater users. This could be a problem with recycled municipal wastewater or
surface water routed through the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. Even pure recharge water can mobilize salts
and agricultural chemicals in groundwater basins that have been heavily irrigated. In urban areas, there is a
similar concern that the raising of the groundwater table as a result of groundwater banking could inadvertently
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appropriative permit change orders to ensure protection of other legal users of
water, including groundwater users.
The risks associated with uncertainties in the state of the law are particularly
problematic for groundwater banking projects. Law reform by the SWRCB or the
legislature to eliminate these uncertainties would greatly advance the exploitation
of this physical solution. For instance, the allocation and demarcation of
authority to control the recharge and extraction of aquifers in such programs is
not well defined. The SWRCB and local authorities often vie for jurisdiction. The
specific procedural and regulatory hurdles will depend on what governmental
bodies assert jurisdiction over which aspects of the project.139 Uncertainties with
respect to property rights in groundwater resources are also particularly
problematic.
A water right permit issued by the SWRCB is required for the appropriation
of surface water for use in a groundwater recharge project, except where the
project can be carried out based on a pre-1914 or other right not requiring a
SWRCB permit. 140 Banking projects that involve the transfer from a surface
source to the actively recharged groundwater bank may also have to obtain a
"change order" from the SWRCB. Such orders will require a finding of "no
injury" to legal users of water.14' Thus, it seems clear that the SWRCB has
authority to regulate the storage of water underground and the subsequent use of
the stored water as a condition of a water right permit to appropriate surface
waters used in underground storage.142 Yet, whatever the SWRCB's de jure
saturate and mobilize chemical compounds that were previously trapped in the unsaturated upper portions of the
soil strata.
139. In cases where the legislature has unambiguously vested management authority over this species of
"groundwater" in a special district, or where a watermaster has been appointed to oversee a court-imposed basin
management plan, the competing jurisdictional claims are probably quieted. But this is a rare circumstance. In
the more typical case, the state of the law is rather unsettled.
140. The Water Code specifies that an appropriation must be for beneficial use. CAL. WATER
CODE § 1240 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005). An appropriation of water diverted to groundwater storage is for a
beneficial use, provided that "the water so stored is thereafter applied to the beneficial uses for which the
appropriation for storage was made." Id. § 1242. This code provision has been analyzed in published opinions
by both the Assembly Legislative Counsel and the California Attorney General. See Op. Leg. Counsel, 1957
A.J. 4034 (1956); 27 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 217, 218 (1956). The Legislative Counsel opinion makes clear that
water placed into underground storage becomes an appropriative right subject to enforcement by the courts. The
Counsel explained that once "water has been introduced into the underground basin for storage, the overlying
landowners would have no rights to such water .... Op. Leg. Counsel, 1957 A.J. 4034, 4035 (1956).
Consistent with this requirement, SWRCB regulations require that applications for appropriations for
underground storage include maps showing points of diversion or rediversion to underground storage, the
locations of the underground storage areas, and the place of use. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 23, § 722 (2002).
141. Many large-scale banking programs may require the wheeling of water through the surplus capacity
of existing conveyance systems. See CAL WATER CODE § 1810 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005). Section 1810
requires its own "no injury" analysis. Such analysis will likely consider injury to existing users at the point of
diversion but not lost sales incurred by the conveyance operator. See San Luis Coastal Unified School Dist. v.
City of Morro Bay, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (Ct. App. 2000).
142. There remains some uncertainty as to when a change petition is required for a groundwater storage
project involving an existing permitted appropriation. The Water Code requires approval of the SWRCB for a
change in the point of diversion, the place(s) of use, or the purpose(s) of use specified in a water right permit or
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authority over groundwater banking, there is a compelling practical limit to the
SWRCB's ability to regulate groundwater recharge and recovery operations. The
SWRCB bases its jurisdiction on its authority over the diversion of surface water
used for underground storage, and it has not asserted authority over the water in
storage. Thus, while the SWRCB may act to protect native groundwater users
from the effects of a groundwater banker, it apparently could not act to protect
the banker from the other groundwater users. This is because the water right
permit system does not apply to the latter. This asymmetry may render its
nominal authority in the aquifer ineffectual in a practical sense.43
Another jurisdictional uncertainty arises over how the SWRCB's authority
interfaces with the powers asserted by local groundwater management entities at
both the water importation and storage stage, and the extraction stages under
their own version of a "no injury" rule. 44 The potential for conflicting or
overlapping standards, procedures, and requirements is obvious.
Sections 10750 through 10753.9 of the Water Code allow existing water
agencies to create groundwater management districts. These districts may
determine safe yield and impose modest restrictions on withdrawals,145 replenish
supplies, 146 and impose fees and assessments on extractions, 147 but they cannot
make binding determinations on matters related to water rights. 48 Districts are
not explicitly authorized to prevent the exportation of groundwater, yet a few
require a permit for withdrawal or export of groundwater. 49 Increasingly,
counties and cities are also asserting jurisdiction over local groundwater
resources, generally to prohibit exportation.
50
license. CAL. WATER CODE § 1702 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005). SWRCB regulations and practice do generally
require a change order in such instances where a project is modified to add additional storage. CAL. CODE
REGS., tit. 23, § 791(e) (2002).
143. The SWRCB must make an injury determination when approving the change order transfer into the
aquifer for storage and subsequent rediversion. Parties potentially affected by the banking operation would have
the opportunity to protest the project as well as seek protection from the SWRCB if the project operation affects
their rights. On the other hand, the SWRCB's authority to protect the banker is not symmetrical; the SWRCB
does not have the power (and, arguably, not the legal authority) to prevent groundwater pumpers from taking
the banked water.
144. The extent of local jurisdiction over parties engaged in groundwater banking is unclear. The
regulation of private entities with regards to groundwater issues has generally been upheld. See Baldwin v.
County of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886 (Ct. App. 1994). However, because of sovereign immunity issues, such
jurisdiction probably does not extend to allow the exercise of police power over cities, counties, and potentially
investor-owned-publicly-regulated utilities. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53090, 53091, 53096 (West 1992 &
Supp. 2005); Lawler v. City of Redding, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 394-96 (Ct. App. 1992).
145. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10753.7 (West Supp. 2005). The authority to limit or suspend extractions
may only be exercised if the district determines that replenishment programs or supply of alternate water
sources is infeasible or inadequate. See id. § 10753.8(c).
146. See id. § 10754.2.
147. See id. § 10754.
148. See id. § 10753.8(b).
149. There are ten specially enacted groundwater management districts and several other local agencies
with groundwater management authority.
150. Groundwater regulation is within the municipal police power. Accordingly, "a local ordinance may
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Demarcating the division of regulatory labor between these levels of
government in advance would help demystify groundwater banking and reduce
the regulatory risk factors. Jurisdiction could be shared sequentially or
concurrently. In a groundwater banking operation, the water moves through a
series of discrete steps from a surface water source, through a conveyance
channel (which may be a natural channel), to a recharge facility, to an aquifer,
through a recovery well, through a conveyance facility (which, again, may be a
natural channel), to a point of ultimate beneficial use. Through each link, the
banking operation has the potential to affect other water rights or cause injury to
other legal uses of water, including instream beneficial uses. If the source water
is subject to permit, clearly the SWRCB has jurisdiction at that point. Is there
then some point in the chain at which the SWRCB loses its jurisdiction, such as
the point at which the imported water is commingled with native groundwater?
Or does it retain jurisdiction to the point of end use?
If the SWRCB is unable to protect groundwater bankers from extractions by
other groundwater users, the feasibility of concurrent jurisdiction is questionable.
In any event, it would seem that the SWRCB pre-empts or supplants local
regulation of the stored groundwater only to the extent of actual conflict. This
raises the question whether the local authorities are able to go beyond the
SWRCB's extent of jurisdiction or only beyond its scope of jurisdiction. In other
words, may the local jurisdiction prescribe measures that are more protective of
the other "legal uses of water," or is it restricted to protecting against types of
injury not covered by SWRCB regulation, such as impacts to structures or crops
from rising water tables, not impacts on other water uses? Under the latter
approach, county regulation that substantially affects the definition or exercise of
water rights, especially post-1914 appropriative rights, are likely to be
preempted.1 51 For instance, the SWRCB's determination as to the volume or rate
be enacted subject to the constitutional constraints applicable to all legislation, unless the power so to do has
been preempted by state legislation, i.e., only if it conflicts with general law." Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 36
Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). There has been a great increase in the number of counties passing
groundwater management ordinances, especially in the last few years. The ordinances vary greatly in terms of
purpose (for example, monitoring, replenishment, export restriction) and type of restriction (for example, permit
compliance, impact analysis, fees). Most of the ordinances require a permit to export groundwater outside of the
county or to extract groundwater in lieu of surface water use. Few of them distinguish between native
groundwater and imported water. A few counties explicitly recognize the value of conjunctive management and
provide an exception to the permit requirement where it is demonstrated that the activity will result in net
annual recharge.
151. Baldwin does not address the extent to which local ordinances may be preempted by the state law
of water rights to surface waters (and underground streams in known and definite channels). It is an open
question whether the county could regulate extractions of imported surface water beyond regulation to make
sure that what is being extracted is in fact the net addition caused by the importation. Concurrent jurisdiction
could exist when the SWRCB makes injury determinations in approving a change order and when counties
require a permit and analysis of impacts to extract groundwater. Because SWRCB injury determinations would
not address every issue subject to county regulations, there is little argument for field preemption, but conflict
preemption could occur on a case-by-case basis for those county and state standards or determinations that are
irreconcilable.
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of banked water that can be extracted without adverse consequence to users of
native groundwater would preclude contrary determinations by the local
jurisdiction.
Uncertainty as to the division of regulatory jurisdiction is compounded by a
degree of uncertainty as to proprietary rights among the importer of the recharge
water, the overlying landowner(s), and the overlying water district. In the case of
imported water,1 52 the case law seems clear that the recharged water belongs to
the importer, less whatever losses may be entailed. 153 Thus, a water right holder
who imports the water with the purpose of later extracting it has the paramount
right to extract that water for use either on the overlying lands or on remote
locations, 54 subject of course to the requirement of avoiding injury to legal users
of the native groundwater with which the imported groundwater may
commingle.155 However, several complications may arise where the law is not
altogether clear.
Who has the paramount claim to augmented groundwater recharge as a
consequence of reoperation of upstream reservoirs? Stated another way, is this
imported recharge water that would not have been available but for the act of
reoperating the reservoir and sending additional water downstream-and
therefore belongs to the reservoir operator--or is it natural recharge that would
have been available to the groundwater users but for the pre-existing operations
of that reservoir, and therefore belongs to those groundwater users? In accord
with the "no injury" rule, it is logical that any additional percolation into the
basin as a result of the project, which is greater than the amount that would have
occurred under a natural state, should be considered imported water, available to
the project and/or its beneficiaries unless the additional project water has been
abandoned.
152. With respect to proprietary rights, this article does not address native or in situ groundwater, to
which overlying landowners presumptively enjoy correlative possessory rights, and groundwater appropriators
enjoy appropriative groundwater rights.
153. This will not hold if it is abandoned or acquired by prescription. A conjunctive use program can
avoid implication of abandonment of banked water if the project ceases its historic extractions to increase
storage levels in wetter years by filing a declaration of intention to extract that water with the SWRCB. See
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1005.1, 1005.2, 1010 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005). Prescription cannot be claimed against
a municipality. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West 1982 & Supp. 2005). Prescription may also be limited to the
extent that the recharge is made with water subject to permit and license, and pumping is for a place or purpose
of use not authorized by that permit or license. See People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859 (Cal. 1980).
154. The California Supreme Court has affirmed the paramount rights of the importer to recapture
foreign water intentionally stored in a groundwater basin either through direct introduction or indirectly as
return flows resulting from surface deliveries. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 142 P.2d 289
(Cal. 1943).
155. Injury could arise, for instance, where extraction wells are located proximate to those of pre-
existing groundwater users and where the rate of extraction creates a cone of depression that increases the
neighbor's pumping power requirements compared to pre-existing conditions. Calculating the amount of water
to which the importer is entitled to withdraw, however, is challenging due to the technical issues described
above. Equally difficult is enforcing one's rights to imported water against unauthorized withdrawals by other
users of the aquifer.
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Where there is local opposition to a project, the issue may arise as to who has
the paramount right to use the dewatered storage space and in what
circumstances may one entity exclude others from doing so. Although the issue
of groundwater storage rights is far from settled, the California Supreme Court
has upheld the right to store water in aquifers.1 56 It is thus likely that the courts
would regard the storage space in an aquifer as a shared asset that any entity can
use when there is no shortage of supply of available storage space in relation to
demand, and that in such circumstances, no entity, including overlying
landowners, can exclude others from using the aquifer storage space nor exact a
"rental" fee for such use. 157
Rather than characterizing the issue of rights to storage space as one of
trespass on a property interest, it is probably more accurate to regard it as just
another application of the "no injury" rule. Thus, the existing rights holders are
probably legally entitled to prevent a water banking project from reducing the
natural infiltration capacity of the aquifer on which they depend to capture and
store the naturally occurring percolating groundwater, or to otherwise adversely
impact their water rights. 158 Under this view, where storage space is plentiful, the
real issue is not "who owns the storage space," but how does one calculate the
amount of water to which the importer is entitled?
59
156. City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 142 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1943), and City of Los Angeles v. City
of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975), uphold Los Angeles Department of Water and Power's
importation and storage of water underground, despite Los Angeles' status as an appropriator and the lack of
any statutorily authorized groundwater management authority. The court in San Fernando, analogizing
groundwater banking to a surface water reservoir, deems this an economical and efficient method of "natural
storage," only subject to the limitation that storage and withdrawal does not harm other legal users, including
interference with natural recharge. 537 P.2d at 1297.
For a discussion of these cases, see Victor Gleason, Water Projects Go Underground, 5 ECOLOGY L. Q.
625 (1976).
157. If overlying users own a correlative share of the aquifer storage space, they arguably would have to
be compensated for use of that space, whether or not they are injured. The Glendale and San Fernando holdings
make no provision for compensation for use of aquifer storage space. Indeed, referring to Los Angeles'
entitlement "to use the San Fernando basin for temporary storage of its water by means of artificial recharge and
subsequent recapture... " the court explained that "no necessity is shown for interfering with this right to use
the basin for storage, for there does not appear to be any shortage of underground storage space in relation to
the demand thereof." City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1297. The California Supreme Court's sanctioning of
such storage without any recognition of a proprietary right on behalf of overlying owners suggests that
overlying owners cannot object to groundwater storage beneath their property absent a showing of injury to a
recognized right associated with their property ownership, such as their right to extract their correlative share of
the aquifer's native yield. Moreover, storage rights are not included in a riparian's correlative surface water
rights, and thus by analogy, it could be argued that storage rights are not part of an overlying owner's
correlative groundwater rights.
158. In the case of interference, imported water will likely be deemed to "spill first" if an aquifer
becomes fully recharged. See City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1250.
159. The basic theory supporting the importer's exclusive right, and for the inapplicability of the no
injury rule under these circumstances, is that but for the importation the water would not be there for the
overlying landowners to extract. To the extent that the water would be still there in the absence of the
importation, because the importation supplants natural recharge or the importation increases losses, the basic
theory does not justify giving the importer any right at all, let alone an exclusive right. It is also important to
distinguish two different questions, the availability of space in storage and the quantity in storage. Making most
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Another key issue standing in the way of widespread groundwater banking in
areas where the aquifers are not in overdraft, such as the Sacramento Valley, is
whether pre-existing groundwater users can be limited to their historic levels of
usage to assure that they are not taking imported water that has been banked in
the same aquifer. The general rule is that, subject to the avoidance of mutual
harm, groundwater users are entitled to as much groundwater as they can
beneficially use as long as the "safe yield" of the aquifer is not exceeded. This is
true irrespective of their historic usage. If their historic use is less than their
correlative share of the safe yield or the amount available for appropriation under
their priority of right, restricting these users to their historic usage thus
diminishes their current entitlement.'
60
The problem may be more apparent than real, however. Groundwater
banking programs are most likely to be established in two circumstances: where
there is a pronounced pre-existing cone of depression that can be filled (the San
Joaquin Valley), or where aquifers are already full such that groundwater will
have to be extracted first in order to create storage space (the Sacramento
Valley). In the first instance, the aquifer may already be in overdraft. In this
situation, current users are not entitled to increase their pumping because that
would necessarily injure other rights holders. In the second case, increased
pumping by historic users is unlikely to adversely affect other users, including
the groundwater banking project, because the aquifer is so full. 6 1 In the
intermediate case-where the basin is close to balance and the groundwater bank
is in an unincorporated area-the appropriate principle would seem to be that
existing uses can be allowed to increase only to the level that would represent
safe yield, absent the groundwater bank. The problem in applying that principle
is the difficulty in establishing the safe yield level short of adjudicating the
effective use of surface reservoirs has led to elaborate rules on which water "spills" first and under what
circumstances. These rules may apply equally appropriately in the context of aquifer storage. One who utilizes
aquifer storage space for artificial recharge may not reduce the overlying landowners of the right to natural
recharge of that aquifer. Thus, if infiltration is reduced due to lack of aquifer storage capacity, the water banker
takes the loss, not the users of native groundwater. In sum, tort-based decisional rules may serve well to protect
landowners and other rights holders from physical injuries or water supply impacts associated with groundwater
banking. They may not serve as well to apportion unsaturated aquifer storage space among the various parties
competing to bank imported surface water. It would obviously facilitate groundwater banking if the legislature
would make clear that the interests of overlying owners in the subterranean space beneath their property does
not include a right to exclude non-injurious use of the unoccupied aquifer storage space beneath their property
for storage of imported water. Such clarification could recognize that the subterranean property is technically
part of the overlying owner's property interest, but that it is subject to non-injurious invasion for groundwater
storage.
160. However, such rights may potentially be subordinated to existing appropriative rights in an
overdrafted basin. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 869 n. 13 (Cal. 2000).
161. The problem is also less likely to arise in areas of groundwater use that are incorporated within
water district boundaries, even those that do not regulate groundwater. Where water districts operate a
groundwater bank within their service area, it presumably does so with the consent and support of those
members who rely on groundwater. Similarly, this problem will probably not arise in adjudicated basins where
the pumpers are limited by the operating judgment to fixed amount of annual extraction, and the watermaster
will likely oversee and monitor groundwater banking projects.
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basin. 162 Even in the relatively rare circumstances where these conditions obtain,
groundwater banking may be practical without adjudication if the bank can
tolerate some increase in groundwater pumping or can purchase forbearance from
pumping increases from existing groundwater users.
Finally, there are entitlement problems associated with in lieu recharge,
where the groundwater banker enters into arrangements with overlying
landowners wherein, during periods when the banker desires to recharge
groundwater, the overlying landowners would forego pumping and use a
substitute surface water supply instead. The aquifer recharges "passively" from
natural recharge and percolation of the applied surface water. When the program
desires to extract groundwater for export, the landowner would curtail its surface
water use and substitute or increase groundwater pumping. The legal problem
with in lieu banking is that the program does not withdraw groundwater that it
has directly and physically put into the aquifer through an active recharge
program. Instead, it requires groundwater rights holders in some years to forego
pumping water that they are otherwise legally entitled to extract, and to offset
that forbearance by drawing more heavily on the aquifer in other years. Sections
1005.2 and 1005.4 of the Water Code treat in lieu use of an imported surface
water supply as the equivalent of the use of the groundwater, thus legally
preserving a user's rights to the supply left in situ.163 As is the case with active
recharge, there are problems of enforcement and accounting. In years of
forbearance, the other pumpers might extract the water that the program intended
to store. In years of extraction, the contracting landowner's rates of withdrawal
may impair the rights of the correlative pumpers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The California water world has changed a great deal since 1978, and yet the
legal structures have remained very much the same. If a new Governor's
Commission were to be convened tomorrow, it is unlikely that it would focus
much attention on the unfinished agenda of its predecessor, perhaps with the
exception of the failure of the state to integrate management of tributary
groundwater into the surface water administration system, an anomaly in the law
which defies both physics and logic yet is readily explained by politics. Today's
agenda would be broader. It would necessarily include federal institutional
reforms as well. It might well focus more on agency mandates than on individual
water rights and their administration by the SWRCB. It should be informed and
driven primarily by an understanding of the types of physical solutions that hold
162. Of course, basin-wide adjudications may be desirable for other reasons. See supra Part I.
163. California Water Code sections 1005.2 and 1005.4 state that where a nontributary source of water
(imported foreign water or conserved water otherwise unavailable to the aquifer) is used in lieu of groundwater
pumping, a reduction or cessation of groundwater pumping to permit groundwater replenishment is deemed a
beneficial use of water and will not result in loss, reduction, or forfeiture of the groundwater rights.
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the greatest promise for reducing conflicts among water users, including
particularly the need for water for environmental restoration, and the legal
barriers to their implementation. This would entail a much more interdisciplinary
and solution-oriented approach. Very likely, it would be dominated by
considerations of how water service benefits from a fixed endowment of water
can be expanded and more equitably distributed. In the final analysis, that is the
touchstone that has shaped water law in California yesterday and will continue to
do so tomorrow.
* **
